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BOOK REVIEW
Paternalism and the Unrealized Promise of ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE.

A review of ESSAYS N THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
By David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick
Durham, North Carolina
Carolina Academic Press (1991)
Pp. 322

Reviewed by John Petrila.

In Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence,' David Wexler and
Bruce Winick argue that mental disability law has too long ignored
the consequences of the rules it establishes. In their view,
academicians and practitioners interested in mental disability law have
focused almost exclusively on questions of ideology and rights,
forfeiting valuable examination of the outcomes caused by judicial
and legislative decisions. In attempting to eliminate the intellectual
"sterility" which they believe characterizes mental disability law, they
propose therapeutic jurisprudence as a way to examine "the extent to
which substantive rules, legal procedures, and the roles of lawyers
and judges produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences. 2
In practice, this would result in a much greater reliance by
legal decision makers on empirical data produced by social scientists:
"Legal judgments . . . are often based on factual

predicates that remain unexamined empirically and
that might turn out not to be true. .

.

. Our aim is to

© Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Journalof Human Rights.
* Chairman, Department of Mental Health Law and Policy, University of South
Florida. The author acknowledges and thanks Mr. Harold Mayo for his review and
comments on an earlier draft of this review.
I ESSAYS IN THERAPEuTIc JURISPRUDENCE (David B.Wexler & Bruce J.Winick,
eds., 1992).
2 David B.Wexler & Bruce J.Winick, Introduction to ESSAYS, supra note 1, at ix.
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suggest that legal decision makers explicitly take
account of this impact, that they become more
sophisticated about and make better use of the insights
and methods of the behavioral sciences, and that
social scientists
audit law's success or failure in this
3
"
regard.

Wexler and Winick describe their mission in rather modest terms:
therapeutic jurisprudence "simply seeks to focus attention on an often
neglected ingredient in the calculus necessary for performing a
sensible policy analysis of mental health law and practice-the
therapeutic dimension-and to call for a systematic empirical
examination of this dimension. 4 Despite this modest claim, they
believe that therapeutic jurisprudence principles have general
applicability far beyond mental disability law and "will also have
applications in forensic psychiatry generally, in health law, in a
variety of allied legal fields (criminal law, juvenile law, family law)
and probably across the entire legal spectrum."'
While there is no evidence that courts have as yet been
responsive to therapeutic jurisprudence, 6 it has struck a responsive
chord among academicians. Essays has garnered high praise from
some of the leading figures in the mental disability law field,7 and a

3 Id. at xi.
4Id.
S Id. at x.
6 A Lexis search performed on Oct. 25, 1993, searching all federal and state court

cases for the term "therapeutic jurisprudence" found no cases. At the same time, it is
evident that courts attempt to examine the impact of their decisions on individuals
without using the label created by Wexler and Winiek. See infra note 10 and
accompanying text. But see Liz Balmaseda, Two Judges Use Therapy to Curb Home
Violence, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 7, 1993, at 1B (reporting that Judges Cindy Lederman
and Linda Dakis use "therapeutic jurisprudence" in applying innovative remedies from
the bench to break the cycle of domestic violence).
7 ESSAYS, supra note 1, at jacket (containing praise from a number of leading
academicians in the mental disability law field). John Monahan writes that "what mental
health law craves are new ideas, and Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudenceis brimming
with them... two of the most creative scholars in the field have produced a work that
can genuinely be called exciting." Id. Paul Appelbaum claims that "therapeutic
jurisprudence is a tonic for what ails mental health law.. . [it] will set the agenda for
the next generation of reform in the civil and criminal systems that deal with the
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literature devoted to the subject of therapeutic jurisprudence is
emerging.'
The popularity of therapeutic jurisprudence among
academicians may be attributable in part to its seemingly undeniable
logic. The argument that people involved in the development of
mental disability law (or for that matter any area of law) should
examine the consequences of legal rules, principles, and procedures,
is difficult to dispute.
At the same time, therapeutic jurisprudence may be criticized
on a number of grounds. First, academicians and others (including
people who have received treatment in the mental health system) may
dispute the assumption that an attempt to obtain therapeutic outcomes
should play a dominant (or for that matter any) role in judicial
decision making. 9 Second, the claim that therapeutic jurisprudence
represents a new way of thinking about disability issues seems
overstated; as the authors acknowledge, the United States Supreme
Court has given at least lip service to the idea that legal principles
established in mental disability litigation should consider whether

mentally ill." Id. Richard Bonnie writes that "these essays will leave an enduring mark
on the field." Id. Wexler describes therapeutic jurisprudence as a "fresh approach to
mental health law." Id. See Jeffrey A. Klotz et al., Cognitive Restructuring Through
Law: A Therapeutic JurisprudenceApproach to Sex Offenders and the Plea Process, 15
U. PUGET SouND L. REv. 579, 579 n.1 (1992) (citing Essays as providing "concrete
illustrations and applications of the approach.").
' See Robert F. Schopp, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand Conflicts Among Values in
Mental Health Law, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 31, 32 (1993) (supporting the use of
empirical data in legal decision making, but acknowledging the fact that "empirical
premises alone cannot determine the correct choice."); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceand Changing Conceptionsof Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. &
L. 17, 29 (1993) (tracing the parallel between questions asked by therapeutic
jurisprudence scholars and those asked by public law scholars); David B. Wexler &
Bruce J. Winick, TherapeuticJurisprudenceand CriminalJusticeMental Health Issues,
16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 225, 225 (1992) (illustrating the
application of therapeutic jurisprudence to criminal justice/mental health issues); see also
Mark A. Small, Legal Psychology and TherapeuticJurisprudence,37 ST. Louis U. L.J.
675 (1993).
' See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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those principles will have a therapeutic impact." ° In addition, other

10Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (upholding the constitutionality of a Georgia
law, in considering voluntary admission of a ward of the state by the Department of
Family and Children Services to Central State Regional Hospital (a mental health
institution), which provided at that time:
The superintendent of any facility may receive for observation and
diagnosis . . . any individual under 18 years of age for whom such
application is made by his parent or guardian ....
If found to show
evidence of mental illness and to be suitable for treatment, such
person may be given care and treatment at such facility and such
person may be detained by such facility for such period and under
such conditions as may be authorized by law.
GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 (1975)). The decision permitted civil commitment of
children without judicial hearing in part because of the concern of the majority that the
imposition of judicial process might impede the treatment of children. Parham, 442 U.S.
at 610. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger noted that:
Moreover it is appropriate to inquire into how such a hearing would
contribute to the successful long-range treatment of the patient.
Surely, there is a risk that it would exacerbate whatever tensions
already exist between the child and the parents. Since the parents can
and usually do play a significant role in the treatment while the child
is hospitalized and even more so after release, there is a serious risk
that an adversary confrontation will adversely affect the ability of the
parents to assist the child while in the hospital.
Id. at 610. But see Michael L. Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical

Response to Chief Justice Warren Burger's 'Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets'
Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 149 (1981)
(disagreeing with the Court's logic). Perlin criticizes the Supreme Court's omission of
"supporting citation, reference to the court record or analysis of behavioral research" in
light of the fact that it "embraced the basic propositions proffered by amicus American
Psychiatric Association (APA) without much consideration of its supporting data. On
the other hand, it totally failed to acknowledge, consider, deal with or rebut the data
presented by anotheramicus,the Division of Mental Health Advocacy of the New Jersey
Department of the Public Advocate." Id. at 152-53 (footnotes omitted). The amicus
curiae brief submitted by the APA concluded that psychological harm would be inflicted
upon the child during due process hearings because of "the unique emotion-laden nature
of the parent-child conflicts" that would be aired, basing its conclusions on several cited
articles considering the traumatic effect of hospitalization on parents; in contrast the
amicus curiae brief submitted by the Division of Mental Health Advocacy of the New
Jersey Department of Public Advocacy highly recommended due process hearings based
upon experience in providing legal representation of juveniles facing involuntary civil
commitment proceedings, accumulated statistics, and records of dispositions acquired
since 1975. Id. at 154-56 (footnotes omitted).

1993]

BOOK REVIEW

881

academicians have expressed similar views under different labels."1
Third, a close reading of therapeutic jurisprudence,
particularly as it is presented in Essays, suggests that the uncritical
enthusiasm with which therapeutic jurisprudence has been embraced
should be tempered by more critical analysis of the key assumptions
made by Wexler and Winick. The core premise of Essays is an
assumption of "general agreement that, other things being equal,
mental health law should be restructured to better accomplish
therapeutic values." 2 As will be discussed in more detail below, this
assumption is questionable. In addition, in making this assumption,
the authors ignore the emerging consumer/survivor movement in
mental health, which challenges the basic premises upon which
mental health policy, practice, and law rest. Academicians,
researchers, lawyers, and mental health professionals may agree that
the premise that the law should seek therapeutic outcomes is an
article of faith while those most affected by the law and mental health
practice may strongly disagree.
Significantly, Essays fails to question who decides what
represents a therapeutic outcome. Instead, Essays simply assumes
that research scientists and lawyers will decide whether a particular
legal rule or intervention has therapeutic value. People treated
voluntarily or coercively by mental health professionals and subject
to legal rules governing the conditions and terms of that treatment are
largely ignored. As a result, people who can provide the best
information about the therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences of
legal/therapeutic interventions are excluded from participating in the
analysis of what is or is not in their interest.
Therapeutic
jurisprudence as it has been conceptualized to date is a conservative,
arguably paternalistic, approach to mental disability law. It relegates
to research psychologists and lawyers decision making authority over
issues of critical importance to individuals who find themselves the
subject of mental health treatment and legally sanctioned coercion.

" See Craig Haney, Psychology and Legal Change: The Impact of A Decade, 17
LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 371 (1993) (reviewing the literature on psychology and its

potential contribution to law and discussing the need for the law and psychology field
to become more inclusive in its perspective). Haney welcomes other points of view,
particularly from feminists and racial minorities. Id. at 387-92.
12 Introduction, supra note 2 at xii.
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In its current state therapeutic jurisprudence, while often cloaked in
the language of autonomy and choice, simply reinforces the existing
distribution of power in the relationship between treater and treated.
In some critical areas it would result in even more power accruing to
professional interests. Until this core problem is addressed,
therapeutic jurisprudence will have little if any practical impact on
many of the questions its authors would like to address and as a
concept one may reasonably predict that it will be actively resisted by
many in the consumer/survivor movement as simply another in a long
series of efforts to assure continued professional dominance over
mental health services and disability law.
Book Contents
Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudenceis a collection of essays
authored by Wexler, Winick, and Robert F. Schopp, either together
or individually, which explore applications of the principles of
therapeutic jurisprudence to a variety of legal topics. Like an earlier
work by Wexler on the same topic," most of the material has been
published elsewhere.
The book is divided into five parts. Part I, entitled Toward a
Therapeutic Jurisprudence,consists of two chapters in which Wexler
establishes the rationale and conceptual framework for therapeutic
jurisprudence. In Chapter 1, Wexler argues that mental health law
has been largely "doctrinal, constitutional, and rights-oriented," an
approach which is heavily dependent on judicial decisions setting
forth constitutional principles.14 In Wexler's view this approach is
"both risky and, after twenty years, sterile." 15 Wexler believes that
as a result of the ideological conflicts which governed mental
disability law in its early phases, lawyers and judges lack trust in
mental health professionals, which in turn has led to a reluctance to
consider behavioral science contributions in articulating and

STHERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AoENT (David B.
Wexler, ed., 1990).
"' David B.Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence,in ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 3.
11Id. at 5.
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evaluating the consequences of legal principles. 16 Therapeutic
jurisprudence, "the study of the role of the law as a therapeutic
agent," is his antidote. 7 This chapter concludes with a description of
the format of a "paradigmatic therapeutic jurisprudence piece written
by an academic lawyer. "18
In Chapter 2 Wexler describes four overlapping areas of
inquiry for therapeutic jurisprudence. 9 These include the role of the
law in producing psychological dysfunction; therapeutic aspects of
legal rules; therapeutic aspects of legal procedures; and therapeutic
aspects of judicial and legal roles. He uses a variety of examples,
including civil commitment and treatment of people found
incompetent to stand trial, to suggest ways in which inquiry by
behavioral scientists may lead to more informed judgments regarding
the therapeutic consequences of legal rules and processes.

"6"The lesson-learning to be skeptical of supposed scientific expertise-is an
important one, and I doubt the law will ever again simply defer to psychiatry and the
related disciplines." Id. at 7. But see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-24
(1982) (announcing that courts were to defer to professional judgment in litigation
involving the rights of people who were institutionalized in state mental disability
facilities). C. Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to
Abdication Under the ProfessionalJudgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639 (1992)
(describing professional judgment as a standard that the Court does not truly understand).
Courts... baste] the professional judgment standard on a powerful
mythology about professionals in the private sphere, but almost
always apply it in a public sector context. The Court's image of
freely chosen professional-client interaction is thus transplanted to
institutional settings where the professionals are state actors, the
professional-client relationship is permeated with state concerns and
conflicts of interest, and the clients are an indigent and captive
population.
Id. at 644.
I? David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence,in ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 8.
11A typical article written in a therapeutic jurisprudence framework will include an
introduction, a description of applicable law, a discussion of relevant psychological
principles and findings, application of psychological principles and findings to the legal
matter at issue, and a conclusion. Wexler, supra note 14, at 13-14.
19David B.Wexler, An Introductionto TherapeuticJurisprudence,in ESSAYS, supra
note 1, at 17.
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Part II of the book includes two chapters written by Bruce
In these chapters Winick develops an argument for
utilizing a model of competency which in most situations would
presume that a person being treated or seeking treatment for mental
illness is competent to make such a decision. A formal adjudication
of competency would occur only if the person objected to treatment,
or if it was decided (by whom is not clear) that the proposed
treatment or intervention may be sufficiently risky and the person's
competency sufficiently marginal that an inquiry into competency
would be conducted. 21 As the discussion below suggests, these
chapters rest on assumptions about the operation of the mental health
system and the relationship between treater and treated that are
suspect at best.
In Part III, David Wexler, collaborating with Robert Schopp,
examines the problem of hindsight bias in the tort system. In Chapter
5 they discuss two proposals for ameliorating the problem of
hindsight bias by fact finders in malpractice litigation.22 They suggest
that the elimination of hindsight bias may be more important in some
types of cases than in others, contrasting malpractice cases where
suicide by prescribed medication has occurred with negligent release
cases in which violence toward another has resulted. Chapter 6
Winick.2 °

20Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction between
Assent and Objection, in ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 41 [hereinafter Competency to
Consent to Treatment]; Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary
Hospitalization:A TherapeuticJurisprudenceAnalysisofZinermon v. Burch, in ESSAYS,
supra note 1, at 83 [hereinfter Winick,Competency to Consent to Hospitalization].
2"Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 20, at 51-67.
22David B. Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, How and When to Correctfor Juror
Hindsight Bias in MentalHealth MalpracticeLitigation:Some PreliminaryObservations,
in ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 135. See Harold Bursztajin et al., "Magical Thinking,"
Suicide, and Malpractice Litigation, 16 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 369
(1988). One solution to the disadvantage of "determination[s] made in retrospect" in
negligence litigation cases is "a carefully documented risk-benefit analysis shared with
the patient through the informed consent procedure." Id. at 369, 375 (footnote omitted).
See also Norman G. Poythress Jr., Negligent Release Litigation: A Proposal for
ProceduralReform, 17 J.PSYCHIATRY & L. 595, 600-03 (1989) (suggesting bifurcated
proceedings to allow juries to rule separately on negligence and harm inquiries).
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continues the discussion of malpractice litigation and the tort
system.' Wexler and Schopp argue that efforts by mental health
professionals to establish clear standards of care in areas susceptible
to malpractice litigation may subvert both the therapeutic outcomes
sought by the mental health system and the goals of the legal
system.' Briefly, Schopp and Wexler argue that if fixed standards
of care are established, mental health professionals in their desire to
adhere to such standards (thereby enjoying some presumed insulation
from malpractice judgments) may act according to their own, rather
than their patients', interest in making certain judgments. This in turn
would undermine their view of the law's goal in applying tort
principles as the reinforcement of the fiduciary relationship between
treater and treated. 25

I Robert F. Schopp & David B. Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due
Care: Psychotherapistsand Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability, in ESSAYS, supra
note 1, at 157.
' In recent years, efforts by psychiatry and other branches of medicine to create
"practice standards" or "practice guidelines" have increased, both in response to
malpractice litigation and to cost-containment efforts by insurers. See, e.g., AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR EATING DISORDERS, 150 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 207 (1993); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, PRACTICE
GUIDELINES FOR MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DIsORDER IN ADULTS, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
(Supp. 1993); CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE PANEL, DIAGNOSIS AND
MANAGEmENT OF ASYMITOMATIC PRIMARY HYPERPARATHYROIDISM: CONSENSUS
DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT, 114 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 593 (1991);
Seymour Perry, The NIH ConsensusDevelopment Program:A Decade Later, 317 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 485, 485 (1987) (discussing the effects of the 1977 National Institute of

Health (NIH) program report calling for technology assessment to reduce health care
costs and improve health care quality). Some states have mandated the creation of
practice standards as part of legislative efforts to regularize practice. E.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 408.02 (West 1992) (directing state government, working with the state medical
associations, to adopt and implement "scientifically sound medical practice parameters
for their respective practices in the state to eliminate unwarranted variations in the
delivery of health care." In developing these parameters, the state was to use "reliable
methodologies that integrate relevant research findings" and utilize "appropriate clinical
expertise" as well. The parameters, once developed, are to be distributed to physicians
and other providers across the state, and are to be used as well in conducting utilization
review in the Medicaid program. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.02(1) (West 1992)).
' Schopp and Wexler argue that in cases other than assault on a patient and other
egregious conduct "both professional organizations and courts should refrain from
establishing . . . concrete professional rules or crystallized legal duties" because
therapists will then attempt to conform their conduct to those rules and risk acting in
their own rather than their client's interests. Schopp & Wexler, supra note 23, at 18283. The authors also argue that as a general rule, courts should adopt as the relevant
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Part IV, called Marshalling Motivation: Threats, Contracts,
and Wagers, consists of three chapters devoted to applying various
behaviorist theories to assure better compliance with treatment
regimens. In Chapter 7 Wexler suggests using a criminal charge of
reckless endangerment against people on conditional release or

standard in tort litigation the standard of "ordinary care and competence" provided by
a member in good standing within the profession. Id. at 161. The authors come close
to an argument that mental health professionals should be exempt from ordinary tort
principles suggesting that "[a]t first glance, these arguments may seem to generate the
intuitively implausible claim that no one should ever be held liable in tort for violating
a fiduciary duty." Id. at 174. While not arguing for an exemption, Schopp and Wexler
do counsel almost complete deference to professional views as to what constitutes
acceptable treatment, based on the assumption that the tort system should operate to
reinforce the fiduciary responsibilities of treater to the person in treatment. Id. While
this may be one goal of the tort system, it is certainly not the only one nor is it even the
primary one. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF

TORTS §1, at 6 (5th ed. 1984) ("The law of torts, then, is concerned with the allocation
of losses arising out of human activities. . . . The purpose of the law of torts is to
adjust [these] losses, and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as
the result of the conduct of another."').
Some readers may fred this chapter problematic in other ways. For example,
Schopp and Wexler use the term "psychotherapy" as roughly synonymous with "mental
health care." id. at 160 n.8. This is an uncommonly broad use of that term. The authors
rest their argument for deference in part on the statement that "outcome research
increasingly supports the contention that psychotherapy produces statistically significant
and clinically meaningful improvements for patients. These positive results tend to last
and to exceed the effects of placebo or pseudo-therapy control groups." Id. at 173.
Contra MARTIN L. GROSS, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY: THE IMAcrr-AND THE
FAILURE-OF PSYCHOTHERAPY,
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION (1978). Gross discusses research studies that conclude that psychotherapy

"has only little, or modest healing powers." Id. at 24-31. He quotes Dr. Lester
Luborsky of the University of Pennsylvania in his opinion that "[i]t cannot be determined
whether the type of individual who profits most would also have profited from another
form of treatment or from change-inducing experiences which usually are not designated
as psychotherapy-or indeed from nothing more than the mysterious change attributed
to the passage of time." Id. at 54. See, e.g., Janice L. Krupnick & Harold A. Pincus,
The Cost-Effectiveness ofPsychotherapy: A Plan for Research, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1295 (1992). Mental health professionals have experienced increased difficulty in
obtaining reimbursement for their services because of a paucity of data which could
convince payers of care that the cost effectiveness of those services has been
demonstrated. Id. Krupnick and Pincus recognize the need for research in the area of
cost-effectiveness in the area of psychotherapy to meet an increasing demand for
accountability by governmental bodies, to serve as a guide to clinical practice, and to
provide a basis for informed policy and reimbursement decisions, for example, in
speeding recovery and shortening hospital stays for cardiac patients. Id. at 1302.
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outpatient status who decline to take their medication. 26 He argues
that negative consequences may occur if a person does not take
medication that has been prescribed, urging that criminal law reckless
endangerment statutes be applied to such situations as they are in
other cases, for example, when people diagnosed as alcoholics do not
follow treatment regimens designed to prevent harm. Wexler focuses
on those "who have a history of violent behavior when they fail to
take antipsychotic medication.",2 7 While some people who have been
diagnosed as schizophrenic may present a danger to others in some
circumstances (as do other people with other characteristics) his
arguments ignore reports from psychiatrists that people decline to
take prescribed medication for a variety of reasons.2" In Chapter 8
Wexler describes a series of principles developed in the general
health system designed to increase adherence to prescribed
treatment.29 He then applies the principles to two alternative forms
of monitoring the status and treatment adherence of individuals
conditionally released after acquittal by reason of the insanity
defense. In some jurisdictions judges oversee the release process,
while in others that function is performed by an administrative board.
Wexler speculates that the judicial model may be superior to the
administrative model because it permits the judge to reinforce for the
individual the importance of following the prescribed treatment
regimen.3"
Part IV concludes with Chapter 9, the longest chapter in the
book.3 In this chapter, Winick argues that government should use
the "psychological power of the bet" to accomplish a variety of social
goals. In his scheme, government would "wager" with citizens in an
effort to achieve particular outcomes. For example, individuals could

2 David B.Wexler, Inducing Therapeutic Compliance Through the Criminal Law,

in ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 187.
2 Wexler, supra note 26, at 193.
2 PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THoMAs GUTHEIL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY

AND THE LAW 114-19 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that "origins of treatment refusal are
manifold").
" David B.Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles and the Insanity Acquittee
Conditional Release Process, in ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 199.
'oId. at 217-18.
"' BruceJ. Winick, Harnessing the Power ofthe Bet: Wagering with the Government
as a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, in ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 219.
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choose to "bet" the government regarding their eventual completion
of a program designed to address drug addiction. If a citizen chose
voluntarily to enter this arrangement, he or she could "win" money
or other rewards established by government by reaching the goal
agreed upon at the start. Conversely, if the person failed ("lost the
bet") he or she would suffer an agreed upon consequence. 2
In Part V, Teaching and Research, Wexler makes a series of
interesting observations about revitalizing the teaching of mental
disability law through use of therapeutic jurisprudence principles. 3
He describes a number of traditional law/mental health issues that
might be re-examined "using the therapeutic jurisprudence lens." 34
These include the right to refuse treatment, treatment for incompetent
death row inmates, and treatment for incompetency to stand trial.
Wexler ends this chapter, and the book, by arguing that the use of
therapeutic jurisprudence will result in an international research
agenda in mental disability law by creating a framework for the
pursuit of multi-national research.
Comments
The authors apply therapeutic jurisprudence principles to a
broad range of legal issues. In many cases an analysis using
therapeutic jurisprudence principles may yield more informed
outcomes than might otherwise occur when legal principles are based
wholly on anecdotal or case-specific information. The authors also
make clear that they do not intend that the law be given over wholly
to research scientists; they acknowledge that in certain circumstances
normative constitutional principles should prevail regardless of what
social science research suggests about the therapeutic or

32 This chapter does not define what the person would lose or by what process, nor

does it discuss the unequal bargaining power that government would have relative to an
individual who in many of the examples Winick uses would lack economic or other
resources that would make "entering the wager" truly voluntary.
33David B. Wexler, Training in Law and BehavioralSciences: Issuesfrom a Legal
Educator's Perspective, in EssAYS, supra note 1, at 293.
34

Id.
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antitherapeutic consequences of those principles." The chapters
written by Winick stress the legal and clinical importance of the
values of autonomy and voluntariness as principles that should govern
decision making by individuals with mental disability.
However, Essays falls short when it suggests therapeutic
jurisprudence can reinvigorate mental disability law, because it does
nothing to challenge professional domination of mental disability law
and treatment. It fails to take account of the growing challenge to
professional hegemony represented by the consumer/survivor
movement in mental health36 and relies upon a set of assumptions
which warrant close examination. These assumptions may be
characterized as described below.

11Wexler explains "[wie do not suggest that all constitutional restrictions be open
to reconsideration in light of the results of a therapeutic jurisprudence assessment. Many
constitutional rules-Ford v. Wainwright's ban of execution of a person found to be
incompetent, for example-will be fully justified on normative grounds even if they
produce negative therapeutic consequences." David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Research Tool, in ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 320
(footnote omitted); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (reversing State decision
inflicting the death penalty upon an insane prisoner as a violation of the Due Process
Clause and the Eighth Amendment). Discussing the Wainwright holding, Wexler defines
the operative normative principle as "the notion that it does not comport with human
dignity to execute a defendant who is so mentally ill that he is unable to understand and
appreciate why he is being put to death." Wexler & Winick, supra, at 313. One of the
difficulties with the approach to therapeutic jurisprudence outlined in Essays is that the
authors provide few criteria other than vaguely defined "normative principles" like that
noted as the justification for the Court's ruling in Wainwright. As a result, the
application of therapeutic jurisprudence principles appears somewhat arbitrary and
dependent on the subjective preferences of people writing about it.
I The nomenclature used to describe people who have been treated in or confined
by the mental health system has become an issue. Some publications use terms like
"survivor," "consumer," "user," and "client" interchangeably. See MARY O'HAOAN,
STOPOVERS ON MY WAY HoME FROM MARS: A WINSTON CHURCHILL FELLOWSHIP
REPORT ON THE PSYCHIATRIC SURVIVOR MOVEMENT IN THE USA, BRITAIN AND THE

NEmERLANDS (1991).
Mental patients' liberation groups "develop[ed] different
terminologies to describe themselves and their work" including but not limited to "expatient," "ex-psychiatric inmate," "client," "consumer," or "psychiatric survivor." Judi
Chamberlin, The Ex-Patients'Movement: Where We've Been and Where We're Going,
11 J. MIND & BEHAV. 323, 326-28 (1990). The differences in terminology reflect the
differing priorities and emphases of the users: those calling themselves "inmates" or
"survivors" generally adopt a more militant stance toward the mental health system. Id.
The phrase used most frequently in Essays to describe people who have been diagnosed
as mentally ill is the phrase "mental patient," a phrase exclusively used by professionals.
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First, as noted earlier, the authors assume "general agreement
that, other things being equal, mental health law should be
restructured to better accomplish therapeutic values." 37 This
assumption on its face is highly questionable. Criticisms of the
"therapeutic state" are common in both popular and professional
literature;3" the views of people who do not share the belief that law
should be devoted to accomplishing therapeutic values should not
simply be discounted. Essays also fails to articulate clear decision
rules for determining when "other things are equal" and whether and
under what circumstances therapeutic values must yield to other
values.39 As a result Essays assumes the triumph of therapeutic values
in ways that appear to be arbitrary. For example, in arguing for a
model of decisionmaking that would presume the competency of the
individual, Winick writes:

' Wexler & Winick, supra note 2, at xii.
3 LOUISE ARMSTRONG, AND THEY CALL IT HELP (1993) (describing in highly
critical terms the explosion of psychiatric hospitalization of children that occurred in the
1980's, principally in private, for profit, psychiatric hospitals). Armstrong reveals the
trials and tribulations of those who have been abused in the psychiatric system (whom
she labels psychiatric survivors). Id. at 3-4. The book relies heavily on accounts
gathered from children who had been hospitalized, recounts the concerted efforts of
hospitals and other providers to gain patients, and expounds the U.S House of
Representatives Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families hearing entitled The
Profits of Misery: How Inpatient Psychiatric Treatment Bilks the Sstem and Betrays
Our Trust, chaired by Representative Pat Schroeder. Id. at 265-71. See also CRY OF
THE INVISIBLE (Michael Susko ed. 1991) (detailing encounters by homeless persons who
have been diagnosed as mentally ill); THOMAS S. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND
PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES 39
(1968) (characterizing commitment proceedings as an example of how "commitment
serves the institutional values of psychiatry as a system of social control. . . . Its
controlling function is hidden under a facade of medical and psychiatric jargon, and is
buttressed by a self-proclaimed desire to help or treat so-called mentally ill persons."
Id.). THOMAS S. SZAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY
OF PERSONAL CONDUCT 296 (1961) [hereinafter THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS]
(denying the existence of mental illness and defining psychiatrists concerns as "deal[ing]
with personal, social and ethical problems in living."). See generally Symposium,
Challenging the TherapeuticState: Critical Perspectives on Psychiatry and the Mental
Health Sstem, 11 J. MIND & BEHAV. 247 (1990) (challenging a variety of mental
health practices in a diverse collection of articles).
" See supra note 35.
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The presumption of competency attaching to the
expression of choice would be rebuttable and vary
with the degree of autonomy present and the
risk/benefit ratio. of the intervention the individual
seeks to elect. When, for example, the risk/benefit
ratio is highly questionable, it may be appropriate to
find a marginally competent individual incompetent
and prevent him from acting in accordance with his
expressed preference.'
This is an argument that autonomy will be honored as a core value
and the individual will be permitted to exercise choice only until
others decide that even a "marginally competent" individual has
chosen badly. Such a result is arbitrary (there are no stated, objective
rules for determining when the "marginally competent" person will
lose the power to decide) and paternalistic (the person loses the
power to decide when someone else will decide that it is appropriate
for her to lose it). While this may be well-intended paternalism it is
paternalism nonetheless. It suggests that Essays does not articulate
the discernible limits on the exercise of therapeutic values that it
endorses.
Second, Essays fails to answer the more important question
of who decides what constitutes a therapeutic outcome. While Wexler
and Winick do not address this point directly, they suggest at least
implicitly that research scientists and lawyers sensitive to research
data will make such decisions. In concluding Part I, which establishes
the rationale for pursuing a therapeutic jurisprudence agenda, Wexler
writes:
[I]n the aftermath of [therapeutic jurisprudence]
research and thinking, the accumulated body of
knowledge may be useful to practicing legal and
mental health professionals. Indeed, with such
knowledge, the professionals might strive together to

' Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 20, at 66.
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reform the law and the legal system to help counteract
mental illness and to help promote mental health.4 t

While the authors suggest several times that the legal system
should consider but not simply defer to research conclusions
regarding the therapeutic value of certain legal principles or processes
some of their other suggestions are contradicting. While arguing for
a departure by lawyers from an adversarial role in some
circumstances, Wexler writes:
[L]awyers may, for example, ask a client to consider
whether the pursuit of a certain grievance is in
actuality an attempt to resist therapy.
For lawyers properly to play such a role,
however, further work needs to be performed in
marshalling mental health insights, in documenting the
extent to which lawyers can be trained to function as
therapeutic agents, and in examining the ethical
implications of that revised role.42
While the suggestion that lawyers on occasion may and should
abandon a reflexively adversarial role may have merit,43 the more
41 David

B. Wexler, An Introductionto TherapeuticJurisprudence,in ESSAYS, supra

note 1, at 38.
42 id. at 36-37.
4 See David B. Wexler, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: MAJOR ISSUES 99 (1981)
(suggesting that counsel thoroughly study the facts of the case; communicate with the
patient, family, and friends; fully understand the events preceding the filing of the
petition; investigate the patient's and family's financial conditions; and explore the
treatment and custodial resources of the community, ensuring application of resources
to "meet the needs of the client as alternatives to involuntary commitment."); Samuel J.
Brakel, Legal Aid in Mental Hospitals, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.23, 93 (1981)
(illuminating the role of law and lawyers "in improving the treatment of the mentally ill"
or "of doing considerable damage" through a comparison of studies from several states);
Robert D. Miller et al., Litigiousness as a Resistance to Therapy, 14 J.PSYCHIATRY &
L. 109, 119 (1986) (footnote omitted) (describing "how adversarial legal proceedings can
reinforce adolescent's resistance to therapy by supporting their challenges to authority
as represented by their therapists. On the other hand, when advocates recognize the
resistance involved in some grievances, they can provide significant assistance. ...
Patients will often accept interpretations from attorneys or advocates when they won't
listen to clinical staff.").
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important point that needs critical examination is the assumption that
lawyers and mental health professionals should act in concert to
identify and promote therapeutic values as one of the core functions
of the legal system.
These two assumptions rest in turn on a third assumption,
which informs many of the major conclusions of Essays. This is the
assumption that in virtually all circumstances the legal system should
defer to the prescriptions of treaters. The rationale for this
conclusion, discussed most comprehensively in the chapters on assent
and voluntary admissions, is that physicians have a fiduciary duty to
their patients and therefore it generally may be assumed absent an
objection by the patient that the proposed treatment is in the person's
best interest." In the model of consent and competency proposed by
Winick, individuals generally would be considered competent unless
objecting to a decision by a mental health professional. He argues:
Other than in contexts in which a high possibility of
conflict of interest between physician and patient
exists, the physician's recommendation provides
strong evidence that the risk/benefit ratio of the
patient's choice is an acceptable one and that the
patient's decision is thus not unreasonable. .

.

. We

should hesitate to interfere with a patient's assent to
a treatment recommended by his physician since the
physician's recommendation ordinarily provides rather
strong evidence that the patient's choice, rather than
being injurious to his welfare, will further it.4"
This characterization of the physician-patient relationship
underlies his arguments in the chapter on voluntary hospitalization as
well.46 This chapter is a critique of the decision by the United States

"Winick's chapters are discussed in detail because they rely explicitly on an
idealized model of the mental health system and treatment relationship permitting a
conclusion that prescriptions of treaters should generally receive deference from the legal
system. Wexler's chapters support the same conclusion.
' Winiek, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 20, at 66-67 (footnotes
omitted).
4See
id. at 83-134.
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Supreme Court in Zinenon v. Burch.47 In Zinermon, the Supreme
Court held that an individual who had admitted himself voluntarily to
a Florida state psychiatric hospital could bring a federal civil rights
action alleging that his rights had been violated when the hospital did
not inquire into his competency to admit himself voluntarily to the
hospital.4 Winick focuses on dicta in the Court's decision which
appears to impose an obligation upon states to inquire into a person's
competency as a condition of voluntary admission.49 Concerned that
this will impose an unduly high standard of competency thereby
discouraging voluntary admissions, he proposes instead a model
which he believes would encourage voluntary admissions, noting that
"[tihere is considerable value in allowing patients to choose
hospitalization voluntarily, rather than imposing it upon them. Indeed,
making patients feel that the decision has been made for them could
undermine the therapeutic value of choice." 0 Winick concludes that
an informal review of the competency of the person seeking
admission will suffice to protect people against unwarranted
admissions, and argues that the cost of an erroneous admission is not
high. After reviewing the risks of error to the individual in other
contexts (for example, the erroneous admission of a child to a
psychiatric hospital or an erroneous injection of medication) he
concludes:

'7 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (deciding whether or not an individual's rights were violated
when he voluntarily admitted himself to a mental health facility while in a confused state
during which he was largely unaware of his surroundings).
Id. at 980-982 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN § 394.465(1)(a) (West 1992) (authorizing
admittance for treatment to any adult "'making application by express and informed
consent"' if he is "'found to show evidence of mental illness and to be suitable for
treatment"', and quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.455(22) (West 1992) ("'[e]xpress and
informed consent' is defined as 'consent voluntarily given in writing after sufficient

explanation and disclosure ...

to enable the person ...

to make a knowing and willful

decision without any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other form of constraint
or coercion."')).
' Id. at 987 (footnote omitted) ("mhe very nature of mental illness makes it
foreseeable that a person needing mental health care will be unable to understand any
proffered 'explanation and disclosure' of the subject matter of the forms that person is
asked to sign, and will be unable 'to make a knowing and willful decision' whether to
consent to admission.").
'o Winick, Competency to Consent to Hospitalization,supra note 20, at 109.
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These potential social and individual costs of error do
not seem present to the same extent in the voluntary
hospitalization context. Nor does it present a similar
potential for conflict of interest which could increase
the risk of error. The costs to the individual of an
erroneous hospital admission are mitigated by the fact
that a voluntary patient may always elect to revoke his
consent to admission at any time, thereby triggering
either discharge or a formal involuntary commitment
hearing within a several day period to determine the
need for continued hospitalization.5 '
In both the treatment and voluntary admission contexts Winick
assumes that the physician's fiduciary responsibilities will ameliorate
the risk of error. He writes:
The fact that the physician is an employee of the
treating institution does not alone create a conflict of
interest in violation of due process, at least where he
is independent and has a professional duty to act in
the best interests of the patient, and can place his
fiduciary duty to the patient over any interests of his
institutional employer. 52
This statement is striking because the only evidence provided for the
conclusion that physicians do not experience conflicts between their
patients and their employers are two opinions of the United States
Supreme Court noteworthy primarily for their willingness to defer to
the judgment of professionals. 5"

5' Id. at 119.
S2 Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment, supra note 20, at 66 n.93.
s The two decisions cited by Winick are Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210
(1990) and Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Parham is discussed supra note 10.
In Washington, a majority of the Court ruled that administrative processes were
sufficient to address objections by prisoners to taking anti-psychotic medication. The
Court wrote that "[ilt is only by permitting persons connected with the institution to
make these decisions that courts are able to avoid 'unnecessary intrusion into either
medical or correctional judgments.'" 494 U.S. at 235 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 496 (1980).

896

NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. X

This is not to suggest that the authors are blind to the
importance of individual choice in therapeutic relationships. Winick,
in particular, notes that therapeutic relationships based on the

This is not the only place in Essays in which the authors do not support their
conclusions with empirical evidence. This lack of citation to empirical evidence is noted
here principally because this is a book devoted to bringing empiricism to bear on the
law. The most obvious examples occur in Harnessing the Power of the Bet, in which
Winick argues for government sponsored wagers with citizens to achieve social policy
ends. At one point, in asserting that government would have to construct different
wagers for different groups of people, he draws a sweeping class-based distinction
without any citation to empirical evidence. He writes:
For people with middle-class values or backgrounds, who may have
a strong ability to delay gratification, the promise of a reward in the
future may be sufficient to motivate present behavior. Thus, middleclass students will work hard to achieve future reinforcement in the
form of good grades provided at the end of a semester and increased
educational and occupational opportunities that may come many
years later. Others, however, including many of the disadvantaged
whose social or health problems government is most interested in
solving, often are more present-oriented,valuing presentutility and
heavily discounting the future. For them, the concept of future
benefits may have little meaning and may not effectively influence
behavior.
Winick, supra note 31, at 237 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This statement is not
only unsupported by even a single footnote, but in context gives the chapter a
comparatively elitist tone, reinforced a few pages later in discussing the applicability of
wager theory to drug addiction. After first reviewing a number of theories about drug
addiction, Winick writes:
I can confirm much of the validity of the behavioral model of
addiction out of a personal experience with drug addiction. The
substance I became hooked on was cappuccino. . . . I do not
suggest that all drugs function the same, of course; some-cocaine,
for example-are undeniably more powerful as reinforcers than
others, and significantly more addicting than caffeine. ...
Nevertheless, despite these differences and many others, the
experience of becoming addicted to caffeine and that of becoming
addicted to these other substances bear important similarities. Indeed,
I believe that my experience with caffeine is not unrepresentative of
the basic experience of becoming addicted to other drugs.
Id. at 253. Even assuming with the author that all addiction has something in common,
comparing an addiction to cappuccino with an addiction to crack cocaine is a completely
academic exercise. In addition, drawing a conclusion about the correctness of a
particular theory of drug addiction based solely on a personal experience with caffeine
in a book devoted to empiricism is an invitation to the reader to dismiss the serious
points the authors are trying to make.
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participation of the person subject to treatment are more likely to
yield good outcomes.' His argument that competency generally
should be presumed and deference given to the judgments of treaters
is based in part on an assumption that doing so will give individuals
more choice. However, the conclusion that the proposed model will
expand choice rests on an idealized world where those providing
treatment and those subject to it almost always reach the same
conclusion, and where the clinical relationship exists devoid of
economic and institutional pressures. This is not the world described
by individuals who have written about their experiences with the
mental health system.
Research has exposed the lack of voluntariness of many of the
"voluntary" decisions made by people entering the mental health
system and the degree to which institutional pressures distort the
relationship between treater and treated."5 It is even more interesting

' Winick observes that "an important rationale underlying the informed consent
doctrine is that giving the patient choice in medical decision making enriches and
improves the decision making process." Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment,
supra note 20, at 79-80 n.152. However, he fails to note problems that may arise in
implementing informed consent principles in the context of a psychiatric-patient
relationship.
'S But see Susan C. Reed & Dan A. Lewis, The Negotiationof Voluntary Admissions
in Chicago'sState Mental Hospitals, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 137 (1990) (exploring the
process by which a high rate of voluntary admissions is achieved). In a study of
admissions to four state mental health centers, Reed and Lewis found that employees of
those centers were under enormous pressure to avoid judicial hearings on people entering
the centers and as a result sought to make virtually every admission a "voluntary" one.
The primary pressure on employees was to continue to have beds available for new
admissions-court hearings also meant time away from treatment. Reed and Lewis found
that staff employed three discrete strategies to obtain a "voluntary" admission. The first
was labeled "persuasion/coercion" where people were told (though it was untrue) that
they would be held longer if they did not sign voluntary papers. Id. at 148-49. The
second strategy was "barter" in which people were told that they would not have the
privileges of other patients if they forced a court hearing. The third strategy was simply
to stall if the person insisted on a hearing by asking the court for adjournments until the
person was ready for discharge. Id. at 152. Reed and Lewis, who drew many of their
observations by speaking with people who had been hospitalized, concluded that "...
laws that have attempted to prevent the threatening of patients with commitment appear
to have been ineffective." Id. at 158. Some clinicians have also recognized that
informed consent is not always taken seriously by mental health professionals.
The legal requirements (for informed consent) have gone as far as
they can. The framework for respect has been created and codes of
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to observe how starkly different the world portrayed in Essays is
from the world portrayed in the growing literature that is emerging

behavior have been prescribed. And that has not been enough...
• Even granting the unlikely assumption that elements of physicians'
overt behavior could be controlled by law, it is clear that attitudinal
change must be accomplished by different means. Physicians must
come to accept the values underlying informed consent before they
will behave accordingly.
Currently, physicians in residency training learn from what they see
around them that informed consent is a nuisance, an alien imposition
of the legal system that must be tolerated....
PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL

PRACTICE 264-266 (1987).

Other factors, such as, poverty and race also affect the amount of information
physicians give to patients about treatment. See 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE
OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND
STUDY

LEGAL

IMPLICATIONS

OF

INFORMED

CONSENT

IN

THE

PATIENT-PRACTITIONER

62, 97-98, 121, 124 (1982). There are also gender biases that influence
the delivery of health care. Even though "women use more physician services than men,
... physicians appear to be more likely to prescribe drugs of all types for women than
for men." Ann A. Hohmann, GenderBias in PsychotropicDrug Prescribingin Primary
Care, 27 MEDICAL CARE 478 (1989) (footnotes omitted). See also Rachel E. Perkins
& Len A. Rowland, Sex Differences in Service Usage in Long-Term PsychiatricCare:
Are Women Adequately Served? 158 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 75, 78 (1991) (discovering
that a lack of "consideration of the gender-specific needs of female patients in either the
planning of services or their delivery" resulted in an inadequate level of rehabilitation);
Nancy G. Kutner & Donna Brogan, Sex Stereotypes and Health Care: The Case of
Treatment for Kidney Failure, 24 SEx ROLES 279, 288 (1990) (concluding that
"stereotypic views of women's and men's social needs should be considered as one of
the factors, [other than "legitimate medical" factors] potentially contributing to
differential kidney transplant rates for women and men."); Jane Levitt, Men and Women
As Providers Of Health Care, 11 Soc. ScI. & MED. 395 (1977) (encouraging "change
to both the sex differential in the provision of health care and the mode of practice of
medicine to which it is tied" (referring to the current mode of medicine "oriented toward
specialized acute care inpatient hospital treatment with priority given to high-level
technology, surgery, and drug therapy." Id. at 397.). It is also clear that changes in
reimbursement systems are exerting enormous pressure on the relationship between
physician and patient, as the cost of services must be considered more explicitly in
individual clinical relationships. E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment: Challenging
Fidelity and Justice, 18 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 20, 20 (1988). "Because physicians
largely control healthcare resources, they are caught in a bind. Somehow they must both
loyally favor their own patients, yet justly show them no favoritism as they help to
distribute resources impartially." Id. at 22.
RELATIONSHIP
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written by individuals who have been treated in the mental health
system. This literature provides a useful counterpoint for examining
some of the core assumptions of Essays.
Judi Chamberlin traces the roots of the consumer/survivor
movement in mental health to approximately 1970.56 Writings by
people who have been patients within the mental health system
suggest fundamental differences with the mental health establishment
regarding priorities of need, the amount of true choice presented to
people seeking or being subjected to treatment, and the amount of
"helping" that occurs within the mental health system. These
differences are significant and need to be examined by academicians
and practitioners in the disability law field because they go to the
heart of Wexler's and Winick's arguments that law should attempt to
create therapeutic outcomes as defined by professionals.
Studies conducted to date show little correlation between
professional identification of what people in treatment need and selfidentified need. For example, in an early study, staff on a psychiatric
unit viewed the gaining of "insight" on the part of people in the role
of patient as the primary goal of treatment, while those who were
hospitalized ranked this last in importance.5 7 In other studies,
professionals reported that "client resistance" was the biggest barrier

5' Judi Chamberlin, The Ex-PatientsMovement: Where We've Been and Where We're
Going, 11 J. MIND & BEHAV. 323 (1990). Chamberlin describes the establishing
principles of the ex-patients' movement which include the exclusion of non patients,
consciousness raising, and self help and empowerment. Id. at 327. In recounting the
history of people formerly treated by the mental health system establishing a movement
of their own, Chamberlin distinguishes between "mental patients' liberation" and "antipsychiatry." Chamberlin describes the latter as "largely an intellectual exercise of
academics and dissident mental health professionals. . . [who have made] little attempt
.. . to reach out to struggling ex-patients or to include their perspective." Id. at 324.
Chamberlin provides valuable insights into the history of the "ex-patients" movement,
and notes the differences of view among those in that movement devoted to "a basic
liberation principle [is] that people must speak for themselves" and a reformist
"consumerism which developed as the psychiatric establishment began to fund ex-patient
self-help." Id. at 333-34. See generally JUDI CHAMBERLIN, ON OUR OwN (1978).
7 Joel E. Dimsdale et al., Conflict in Treatment Goals Between Patients and Staff
14 SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY 1, 3 (1979) (confirming that "patients and staff operate on very
different wavelengths as far as their ideology about goals for therapy . . ." especially
concerning insight); see Priscilla Ridgway, The Voice of Consumers in Mental Health
Systems: A Call for Change, A PROJECT OF THE CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CHANGE
THROUGH HOUSING AND SUPPORT, University of Vermont, Dec. 1988.
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to service utilization by a group of 286 people in community
treatment, with financial issues and transportation being ranked much
lower. In contrast, 100% of the people in treatment reported that
financial problems were the biggest barrier to utilizing service and
obtaining necessary supports, with transportation and the lack of
availability of services also noted as major problems.5" Similar
findings have been reported comparing consumer and professional
opinions regarding housing.5 9
These studies are important because they suggest that mental
health professionals and people treated by them view need in
fundamentally different ways. This suggests in turn that the idea of
choice presented in Essays is for many people a false one: even
where autonomy is preserved in an individual therapeutic relationship,
the universe of choices available to a person often does not include
the very things identified as most pressing.
People who have undergone treatment in the mental health
system also report a much less idealized experience than that
imagined in Essays. One unpublished report, summarizing interviews
with forty-six people (including thirty-four who were former or
present consumers) notes that "while respondents cited a variety of
sources of stigma, most frequently mentioned were the attitudes and

" See Mary M. Lynch & Jean M. Kruzich, Needs Assessment of the Chronically
Mentally Ill: Practitionerand Client Perspectives,13 ADMINISTRATION MENTAL HEALTH
237 (1985) (discussing the confusion regarding the types of services required to enable
the chronically mentally ill (CMI) to function independently in the community).
"9A study of client housing preferences revealed that three-quarters of a hospital
staff believed that individuals in their care required highly structured housing while only
one-quarter of those hospitalized wanted such housing. Phyllis Solomon et al., A
Comparisonof Perspectives on Dischargesof Extended Care Facility Clients: Views of
Families, Hospital Staff, Community Mental Health Workers, and Clients, 15 ADMIN.
MENTAL HEALTH 166 (1988) (reporting study results that a majority of mentally disabled
persons confined to institutions prefer solitary and independent living conditions upon
discharge, in contrast to family and staff concerns that released clients would not be able
to control their own behavior in that type of setting). See also Howie T. Harp, Taking
Issue: Taking a New Approach to Independent Living, 44 HosP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 413 (1993) (describing the desire of "most consumers of mental health
services" to live independently); Priscilla Ridgway & Anthony Zipple, The Paradigm
Shfit in Residential Services: From the Linear Continuum to Supported Housing
Approaches, 13 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION J.11(1990).
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practices of the mental health system and its workforce. " 60
Interviewees characterized a number of specific practices as
stigmatizing, including issues of power and control particularly:
forced treatment and its threat, reinforcement of the point of view
that people in the role of patient had lower status than professional
staff, forced separation in many mental health programs of people
with psychiatric disabilities from ordinary community life, the
absence of challenge or an orientation to personal growth in the
mental health system, and a pervasive lack of privacy.
Some former patients have recounted in personal terms the
sense of powerlessness which accompanies the onset of serious
psychiatric illness. This powerlessness is often reinforced by the
mental health system. Two of these accounts are quoted at some
length, because they challenge the core premise of Essays that
researchers, practitioners, and lawyers, working in concert, are
capable of defining and implementing therapeutic values.
Patricia Deegan, a nurse, recently described her reactions as
she was being told by her doctor that she had been diagnosed as a
chronic schizophrenic.6"
I remember that as these words were spoken to me by
my psychiatrist it felt as if my whole teenage
world-in which I aspired to dreams of being a valued
person in valued roles, of playing lacrosse for the US
Women's Team or maybe joining the Peace Corpbegan to crumble and shatter. It felt as if these parts
of my identity were being stripped from me. I was
beginning to undergo that radically dehumanizing and
devaluing transformation from being a person to being
an illness; from being Pat Deegan to being 'a
schizophrenic.' As I look back on those days I am
struck by how all alone I was. This profound sense of
being all alone only served to compound my sense of

o Deborah E. Reidy, "Stigma is Social Death": Mental Health Consumers/Survivors
Talk About Stigma in Their Lives. Education for Community Initiative (Feb. 1993)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
1 Patricia Deegan, Recovering Our Sense of Value After Being Labeled Mentally Ill,
PSYCHOSOCIAL NuRsiNG, Apr. 1993, at 7.
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feeling worthless and of having no value . . . in a
very fundamental way I experienced myself as being
all alone, adrift on a nameless sea without compass or
bearing. And that deep sense of loneliness came from
the fact that although many people were talking to me
about my symptoms, no one was talking to me about
how I was doing.62

Betty Blaska describes in her account the lack of power and
autonomy that characterizes the daily lives of many people treated for
mental illness. 6"
The first time you experience dystonia from the
neuroleptics they've given you, you're extremely
frightened. Your tongue is rigid and you're unable to
control its movements. You rush to the nurse's station
and they're all huddled inside the little cage's
protective walls. They won't leave it for fear of
contamination. They are puzzled by your presence
and seem greatly inconvenienced by it. You can't
speak because of your tongue's movements. Yet they
wait impatiently for you to tell them what's wrong.
And you wonder what's wrong with them. Can't they
see your predicament? But, no. It's not that they
don't see. They don't feel. Because you don't count.
You're on your way to becoming a CMI.'
Blaska continues a description of her experiences:
As an inpatient in what's called a 'mental institution'
you go to something they call OT-occupational
6

Id.

6 Betty Blaska, First Person Account: What It Is Like to Be Treated Like A CMI 17

SCHIZOPHRENiA BULL. 173 (1991).
' Id. Blaska uses "CMI" as shorthand for "chronically mentally ill," the label often
applied to people who have been treated more than once or for more than a brief period
of time for mental illness. Blaska uses the acronym to reinforce the depersonalization
experienced by many people treated for mental illness, who often become known more
frequently by a label attached by others than by their name.
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therapy. Everything here is called therapy-even
when it isn't. And today it's 'assertiveness' class!
Whoopie! Someone back in the 1960s decided that the
hallmark of a mentally healthy person was being
assertively able to choose and refuse, speak, act, and
listen. This is a mockery inside a place called a
"mental institution" because here no mental patient is
free to choose, refuse, speak, or act. You can't even
listen to each other without someone spying,
reporting, recording, and charting. And then calling
you paranoid if you notice. Or object.
And when you refuse an activity or
"therapy"-which they tell you is your right-and
which they've taught you to do in their 'assertiveness'
class, then they badger you by sending nurse after
nurse, attendant after attendant, into your room to
remind you that "It's 1:00. Time for OT!" Your
refusals mean nothing. They badger you until you
either give in and go, or they've frustrated you to
tears. Or enraged you to anger. And then they can
justify calling you by the malignant label they've
designated you by-resisting treatment or
"noncompliant,"
passive dependent,
passive
aggressive, paranoid, or borderline personality
disorder. They're all different labels. But they all
mean the same thing: you're not really you. You're
just a CMI. And that justifies their dehumanization of
you.
And of course you've lost your job. Who
could work amid all this drug experimentation? And
the myriad of drug side effects-nausea, diarrhea,
dizziness. Vision so bad you can't cross the street
because you can't judge the cars' distance from you.
Drug-induced psychosis so bad you can't leave your
bed or look out the window for the terror you feel.
Blood pressure so low you can't stand for very long,
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and your voice so weak you can't be heard across a
telephone wire.65

In recent years, some professional attitudes have begun to
change-in the last few years, particularly with the growth of the
psychosocial rehabilitation movements and services designed by
consumers, 67 some mental health services informed by true respect
for individual autonomy and choice have emerged. However, we
professionals who make our livelihoods and careers in mental
disability law often fail to seek the opinions of those most affected by
the work we do. Legal decisions often devalue individuals who have
been labeled mentally disabled, and often mask stereotypical views of
those who are disabled.68 Yet even public mental health systems have
created formal roles for consumers, 69 and, in general medicine an

Iid. at 174-175.
The psychiatric rehabilitation movement is a philosophy of treatment which
explicitly seeks not only the participation of the person diagnosed as mentally ill in
treatment but looks to the person to be primarily responsible for designing the goals and
substance of the treatment process. It also seeks to combine social supports like case
management and housing with more traditional medical treatment. WILLIAM ANTHONY
ET AL., PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION (1990); WILLIAM ANTHONY, PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION (1979).

7 See, e.g., Judi Chamberlin & Joseph A. Rogers, Planning a Community-Based
Mental Health System: Perspective of Service Recipients, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1241
(1990); Judi Chamberlin et al., Consumers, Families, and Community Support Systems,
12 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION J. 93 (1989); Esso Leete, A Consumer Perspective
On Psychosocial Treatment, 12 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION J. 45 (1988); HOWIE
T. HARP, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DISABILITY AND REHABILITATION RESEARCH
CONSENSUS VALIDATION CONFERENCE ON STRATEGIES TO SECURE AND MAINTAIN

EMPLOYMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH LONG TERM MENTAL ILLNESS, EMPOWERMENT OF
MENTAL HEALTH CONSUMERS IN VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION (1992).

' See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism", 46 SMU L. REv. 373, 376-77 (1992)
(urging a total restructuring and re-education of counsel, judges and legislators, "both
substantively and attitudinally" to eliminate bias against mentally disabled persons
especially in the drafting of statutes or writing of opinions). Cf. Michael L. Perlin,
Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of 'Ordinary Common Sense, 'Heuristic
Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 131
(1991).
" A report by the National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors
(the association of state commissioners of mental health) reported that 65% of state
mental health agencies provided at least some financial support for consumer-run and
family-run programs (the family and consumer/survivor movements are separate
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influential body of work is emerging which relies principally on the
reports of patients in assessing the quality and effect of medical
interventions. 70
Essays, however, like most of the mental disability law
literature, is virtually devoid of any reference to experiences like
those recounted above, or to the literature that suggests that the
people providing treatment and the people receiving it may have
fundamentally different views on questions of need and whether the
mental health system is in fact infused with therapeutic values. This
is not a minor point, because Essays depends on a particular point of
view about the way in which the mental health system works. That
point of view is in many ways highly idealized, and assumes the
existence of choices that often simply do not exist. It is ultimately
paternalistic, because it honors autonomy as a value only until
professionals decide that other values should triumph. It holds
therapeutic jurisprudence subordinate to constitutional values but
reinforces the existing distribution of power between professionals
and people with disability. Until these issues are confronted directly,
in therapeutic jurisprudence specifically and in mental disability law
generally, the promise that the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence
has for reinvigorating mental disability law will go unrealized.

movements in most respects), and that 19 states had established consumer offices or had
definite plans to start such an office. National Association of State Mental Health
Program Directors Studies, Survey #92-720, (Mar. 22, 1993).
o E.g., New Patient Preference Tools Force Tough Choices, 4 REP. MED.
GUIDELINES & OUTcoME RES. 1,2 (1993). Dr. Robert Nease has developed a computer
program to assess the tradeoffs people with angina are willing to make when presented
with competing treatment choices. Such information will be used in the development of
practice guidelines, which to date have been developed with little information about
patient choices. See, e.g., Bob Curley, Managed Care Study to Examine Outcomes and
Satisfaction, MENTAL HEALTH WEEKLY, Aug. 24, 1992, at 4 (announcing the use of
"the Health Status Questionnaire (SF-36) and a self-evaluation instrument to measure
quality of life and improvement in symptoms" by a managed care company to measure
satisfaction (by clients) with its services).

